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THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
AND NEW YORK TIMES V SULLIVAN:
PROVIDING PUBLIC FIGURE
DEFAMATION A HOME ON THE INTERNET
CHRIS WILLIAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION

Chances are, if you logged onto the Internet' during the
homestretch of the 2008 presidential campaign season, you likely
came across some false information. This misinformation ranged
from stories published and emailed throughout cyberspace,
implying that then Senator Barack Obama could potentially be Al
Qaeda's version of the Manchurian Candidate, 2 to the posting of
altered pictures objectifying Alaskan Governor Sarah Palin. 3
Accessible at home, at the office, and virtually everywhere else
through technological advances like cellular telephones, the
Internet has proven its ability to educate, entertain, and enrich
the lives of Americans on a truly grand scale. With direct access to

J.D., cum laude, January 2010. The author would like to thank the 20092010 Editorial Board of THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW for their hard work
and diligence in assisting with the publication of this article. The author
would like to further thank his family, Kirsten and Tommy, for their
unconditional love and support throughout this project and always. Lastly,
the author would like to recognize David Hayes and Maria Metropulos for
their substantive editorial and scholarly assistance on this publication.
1. See United States of America: Internet Usage and Broadband Usage
Report, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/
us.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (stating that 227,719,000, of the
307,212,123 people living in the United States, or roughly 74% of the total
population, are currently using the Internet).
2. See Who Is Barack Obama? SNOPES.COM, http://www.snopes.com/
politics/obama/muslim.asp (containing a reproduction of the email forward
implying that then Senator Barack Obama was raised learning the tenants of
Radical Islam and may have affiliations with those terrorist groups poised to
attack the United States).
3. See Call to Arms SNOPES.COM, http://www.snopes.com/photos/politics/
palin.asp (containing a reproduction of altered photos with Governor Palin's
head superimposed on the bodies of other women appearing as if Governor
Palin is posing on the cover of Playboy Magazine). The website further
contains the email forward containing an altered picture of the Governor's
head posted on the body of a woman in a U.S. flag bikini holding a rifle. Id.
This email surfaced within a week of the Governor's nomination as the Vice
Presidential Candidate of the Republican Party. Id.
*
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the lives of so many Americans, however, comes influence and
control.
Thus, the online publisher possesses the unique ability to
convey his message to a mass audience while simultaneously
maintaining a self-determined level of control over both the
content and the identity of the content provider. But what happens
when the content, anonymously published and riddled with
falsities, influences the way populous perceives a public figure?4
Do these online falsities rise to the level of defamation?
This Comment will explore the current state of defamation
law as applied to the Internet through the lens of a public figure.
Specifically, it will demonstrate that the conservative application
of the public figure standard in defamation law, coupled with the
blanket immunity granted to publishers and distributors of online
content, grants no effective cause of action to a political figure
defamed on the Internet. Part II of this Comment examines the
background of the case law, giving rise to the modern standard for
proving defamation of a public figure and the interplay between
defamation and free speech. Part II also explores the history of
The Communications Decency Act 5 and how issues of free speech
have already limited its application. Part III analyzes how the
application of public figure defamation law and the CDA together
leave a public figure remediless for damage to his reputation. Part
IV of this Comment proposes that the standard for public figure
defamation be slightly adjusted and actually enforced by the
judiciary as set out by the United States Supreme Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan.6 Lastly, this Comment proposes abolishing
the automatic immunity granted to online publishers and
distributors of defamatory material through the CDA in lieu of a
standard more closely related to that of their print media
relatives.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defamation Law and Public Figures

Black's Law Dictionary defines 'defamation' as "the act of
harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to

4. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 782, 798 (1986) (noting that elections are won and lost by
implications of adultery, corruption, and criminal misconduct). Reputation is
the lifelong culmination of economic, political, and social capital, which, when
attacked, usually cannot be simply rehabilitated by rebuttal from the victim.

Id.
5. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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a third person."7 The Supreme Court of the United States,
however, has modified the application of this common law tort as
applied to public figures. To understand how this interpretation of
defamation law has developed into an impossible standard for
public figures, one need only look to New York Times v. Sullivan.
1. New York Times v. Sullivan: Background
This landmark case was born out of turbulent times in
American history. On March 29, 1960, a full-page advertisement
appearing in The New York Times entitled "Heed Their Rising
Voices" called for financial support for the legal aid of Rev. Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and other members arrested for their part
in the civil rights movement taking place in the southern United
States during the late 1950s and early 1960s.8 Contained within
the advertisement was a recitation of the numerous arrests of Dr.
King and the arrests of University of Alabama students protesting
the state's treatment of African Americans on the steps of the
state capital.9 It is from this advertisement's language upon which
the forthcoming litigation was grounded.1 0
7. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 449 (8th ed. 2004); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (listing the model elements for proving
defamation proposed by the American Law Institute as a false, defamatory
statement about another, published by a third party without privilege,
amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, constituting an
injury in the publishing itself or causing special injury though publication).
8. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 305 (Appendix Containing the
Advertisement) (recounting multiple atrocities perpetrated against African
Americans throughout the south and calling upon "[diecent minded
Americans" to lend their verbal and financial support to the civil rights
movement).
9. Id. at 257-58.
10. See generally Kermit L. Hall, "Lies, Lies, Lies"- The Originsof New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9 COMM. L. POL'Y. 391, 405-20 (2004) (discussing at
length the historical background of the parties to the litigation, an overview of
the political climate of Montgomery, Alabama, during the early 1960s, and the
events leading up to Sullivan's discovery of the article in question and
subsequent filing of suit against The New York Times); see also New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 257 (listing the two paragraphs of the advertisement that
would become the focus of litigation). They read as follows:

In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country, 'Tis of Thee'
on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and
truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the
Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested
to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was
padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.

Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his
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The sitting Montgomery Commissioner of Public Affairs
Lester Bruce Sullivan"1 was charged with overseeing the
Montgomery Police Department, Fire Department, Cemetery
Department, and The Department of Scales. 12 Upon having this
advertisement brought to his attention, Sullivan's attorney noted
that by impugning the behavior of the Montgomery Police
Department, the ad was in fact discrediting his administration.' 3
A libel suit against the named civil rights leaders containedl 4
within the advertisement, and The New York Times, ensued.15 A
jury hearing the case in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County
awarded Sullivan $500,000 in damages, finding the published
article libelous.' 6 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.' 7
home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person.
They have arrested him seven times-for 'speeding,' 'loitering' and similar
'offenses.' And now they have charged him with 'perjury'-a felony under
which they could imprison him for ten years.).
Id.
11. See Hall, supra note 10, at 399-401 (providing a detailed personal and
political history of L.B. Sullivan and noting that Sullivan was a one-time
member of the Ku Klux Klan).
12. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
13. See Hall, supra note 10, at 409-15 (recounting the advertisement's path
to Sullivan). Three of the major participants in the events leading up to this
historic litigation make simultaneous and well-documented discoveries of the
controversial advertisement: (1) William H. McDonald, assistant editor of The
Montgomery Advertiser, (2) Ray Jenkins, editor of The Alabama Journal, a
sister paper of The Advertiser, and 3) Merton Nachman, Sullivan's attorney
who would later argue the case in front of the United States Supreme Court.
Id. at 409-12. It was Nachman who physically brought this advertisement to
Sullivan and encouraged him to file suit for libel. Id. at 415
14. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 144 So.2d 25, 29 (Ala. 1962) (noting
that along with The New York Times, Alabama Clergymen Ralph D.
Abernathy, Fred L. Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and J. E. Lowery, were also
named as defendants in the complaint); see also Hall, supra note 10, at 408
(noting that the advertisement contained endorsements from popular cultural
and political figures of the day, including: Eleanor Roosevelt, Norman Thomas,
Marlon Brando, Harry Belafonte, Sidney Portier, Shelly Winters, Van Heflin,
Nat Hentoff, Ertha Kitt, Nat King Cole, and Frank Sinatra).
15. See Hall, supra note 10, at 393 (noting that scholars and legal
commentators have done little in analyzing New York Times in the face of the
social and political norms of the 1960s South). Hall remarks that the southern
courts, considerably more so than northern courts, were used as a vehicle to
preserve civility and manners in the political dialogue. Id. Common law libel
actions were the road used to force the courts into maintaining the status quo.
Id.
16. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
17. See New York Times, 144 So.2d at 37 (applying Alabama precedent
"[w]here the words published tend to injure a person libeled by them in his
reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with an indictable
offense, or tends to bring the individual into public contempt are libelous per
se."). Once the defamatory statement is classified as libelous per se, damages
are presumed by law. Id. at 41. See also Iron Age Publ'g Co. v. Crudup, 5 So.
332, 332-33 (Ala. 1889) (holding that special damages need not be pled when
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2. The Standard
Upon granting Certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Brennan framed the issue as "whether this rule of
liability, as applied to an action brought by a public official against
critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and of
the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."18 Sullivan, citing the Supreme Court's previous
language, argued that "the Constitution does not protect libelous
publication."1 9 The Court, however, reviewing under the pretext
that public discourse leads to social change, rejected Sullivan's
contention and sought to examine the case "against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."20 Through this lens, the Court held the advertisement

defamation is shown to be libelous per se). Cited by the Alabama Supreme
Court in New York Times as controlling authority. New York Times, 144 So.2d
at 39.
18. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 268.
19. Id. at 264; see Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)
(rejecting "the view that freedom of speech and association. . . are 'absolutes'
not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists
it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be
gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment."). Although
plaintiff passed the California bar examinations, the California State Bar
refused to grant him admission to the bar on account of plaintiffs refusal to
answer questions about his past involvement with the Communist Party. Id.
at 38. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the United States Supreme Court
twice, having the ruling of the California Supreme Court affirmed both times.
Id. at 37-40, 56. See also Chaplinski v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571 (1942) (stating that certain classes of speech, when punished, do not rise
to First Amendment protection, including libelous speech). The speech at
issue in this case was the plaintiffs shouting, in close proximity to City Hall,
that the local officials were fascists. Id. at 569. See also Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (stating that libelous utterances, like obscene
speech, are not within the realm of constitutionally protected speech).
20. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. There are many other examples of
the Supreme Court's protection of freedom of speech and freedom of press in
criticizing public officials. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
(noting that First Amendment protection was created to ensure the exchange
of ideas leading to political and cultural change); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (advancing the principle that the First
Amendment is predicated upon the notion that the larger and more diverse
the pool from where the information flows the more enriched is the welfare of
the American populous becomes. Freedom of the press is requirement to a
truly free society); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (observing
that it is an inherently American benefit for one to speak his mind, even if the
content is in poor taste); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, (1963)
(declaring that First Amendment protections needs room to grow, and thus the
government may only regulate these rights with limited focus).
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was protected speech under the First Amendment, thus
overturning the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court. 21 The
resulting decision set the standard for a public figure proving
defamation in the shadow of the First Amendment. Justice
Brennan annunciated the standard that remains in place today:
the constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. 22

B. The CommunicationsDecency Act
Congress passed The Communications Decency
("CDA" or "Act")23 into law as part of
Telecommunications Act of 199624 without much
the
regulating
with
Along
debate. 25

Act of 1996
the larger
attention or
mainstream

21. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271, 292. See generally John M. Huggins,
Constitutional Law-Freedom of the Press-Libel-State Allowing Libel Suit
by Public Official Without Proof of Malice Held Unconstitutional New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 42 TEX. L. REV. 1080, 1084 (1964)
(suggesting that it follows naturally from the holding in New York Times that
the criticism of a candidate's qualifications for public office is equally as
essential to the criticism of a public official's conduct once in office).
22. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; see Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 596
F. Supp. 1170, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (explaining that the "malice" standard, as
used in public figure defamation actions, is a term of art, meaning to publish a
statement about a public figure believing it to be false or with reckless
disregard as to whether the statement is true).
23. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560, 561
(2006).
24. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (2006).
25. See Mary Kay Finn, Karen Lahey & David Redle, Policies Underlying
Congressional Approval of Criminal and Civil Immunity for Interactive
Computer Service Providers Under Provisionsof the CommunicationsDecency
Act of 1996 - Should E-Buyers Beware?, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 347, 353 (2000)
(noting that major portions of what would become The Communications
Decency Act of 1996 were added after the conclusion of committee hearings
and were thus offered on the floor without the benefit of extensive review); see
also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 858 n.24 (1997) (citing
Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, The State of the
Technology, and the Need for CongressionalAction, 104th Cong. 7-8 (1995)
(Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)).
It really struck me in your opening statement when you mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, that it is the first ever hearing, and you are absolutely right.
And yet we had a major debate on the floor, passed legislation
overwhelmingly on a subject involving the Internet, legislation that
could dramatically change-some would say even wreak havoc-on the
Internet. The Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and never
once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an hour or so
on the floor.
Id.
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telecommunications industry, 26 portions of this Act were directed
at regulating the spread of obscenity to minors via the Internet.
These early attempts at online regulation were codified into two
prevailing sections: Section 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone
calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign
communications) 27 and Section 230 (Protection for private blocking
and screening of offensive material). 28
Section 223 of this Act sought to criminalize the transmission
of any obscene, indecent, or other communication describing any
patently offensive material, measured by contemporary
community standards, to a person eighteen years of age or
younger. 29 Upon signature into law by President Clinton, the
constitutionality of Section 223 was immediately challenged by
The American Civil Liberties Union on the grounds the section
was an abridgement upon Free Speech. 30 This paved the way for
the United States Supreme Court to overrule Section 223 in Reno
v. American Civil Liberties Union,31 thus leaving only Section
23032

as the controlling law on offensive Internet content.

26. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 857-58 (stating that
"the major components of the statute have nothing to do with the Internet;
they were designed to promote competition in the local telephone service
market, the multichannel video market, and the market for over-the-air
broadcasting."). The Act included seven Titles, the first six of which were
byproduct of lengthy committee hearings, debates, and Senate and House
Committee Reports. Id. at 858. The Communications Decency Act, Title V,
consisted of provisions that were either added in executive committee mostly
after the hearings were over. Finn, Lahey & Redle, supra note 25, at 353.
27. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996), invalidated by Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996) (current version available at 47 U.S.C. § 223
(2006)).
30. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (noting that the ACLU filed this action the day the bill was signed into
law, on February 8, 1996, alleged that aforementioned portions of Section 223
are unconstitutional on their face, and sought and obtained a temporary
restraining order).
31. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 878-79 (holding that section 223 of the CDA was
not narrowly tailored to the government interest). The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that section 223 placed an
overbearing restriction on free speech. Id. at 882. The Court, analogizing to
the old adage of not burning down the house to roast the pig, noted that
section 223 threatened to "torch a large segment of Internet community" in an
effort to protect a small portion of the users. Id.; see also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at
857 (noting that while the CDA was undergoing its Genesis in Congress, the
United States Justice Department relayed the view that cyber-based child
obscenity, solicitation, and pornography cases were already being effectively
prosecuted under existing laws and will successfully remain to do so). See also
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(d) (2006) (amending prior unconstitutional language to
now read "obscene or child pornography").
32. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
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Section 230,3 "the good Samaritan" section, 34 centers on
immunizing providers of "interactive computer service[s]" 35 for
their attempts to restrict access to constitutionally protected
material. This section is further significant for noting that the
content provider cannot be "treated as the publisher or speaker"3 6
of any distributed material. The practical application of Section
230 is best examined by looking to the subsequent judicial
interpretations.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.37 involved the posting on an
America Online ("AOL") message board of advertisements for
offensive material relating to the terrorist attack on the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 38 These
advertisements, posted anonymously, listed plaintiff Zeran's
telephone number as the point of contact for purchasing the
offensive material.39 Shortly thereafter, plaintiff began receiving
40
abusive phone calls, angry messages, and even death threats.
Although AOL was notified almost immediately of the error, they
refused to post a retraction.4 1 Members of the Oklahoma City
media soon discovered the advertisement and broadcasted Zeran's
telephone number over local radio while the radio host urged the
listeners to call. 4 2
Zeran initiated suit against AOL,43 on April 23, 1996,44
seeking to hold AOL liable for the defamatory speech initiated by a
third party. Specifically, Zeran argued "that once he notified AOL

33. Id.
34. See id. § 230(c) (noting the title of the section as: "protection for 'good
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material.").
35. See id. § 230(f)(2) (defining "interactive computer service" as any
"information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.").
36. Id. § 230(c)(1).
37. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
38. Id. at 329.
39. See id. (noting that the bombing occurred on April 19, 1995). The
subsequent offensive postings appeared on AOL as soon as April 25, 1995, and
instructed solicitors to ask for plaintiff Zeran by his first name, Ken. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. (providing that after Zeran's telephone number was broadcasted
by Oklahoma City radio station KRXO, his home was placed under police
surveillance out of concern for his safety). At its worst, Zeran was receiving
threatening phone calls approximately every two minutes in response to the
advertisement and subsequent news coverage. Id.
43. See id. at 330 n.1 (stating that Zeran was not able to discover the
identity of the originator of the defamatory advertisement and thus not
eligible to file a suit against them directly).
44. See id. (noting the suit was transferred from the United States Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma to the Eastern District of Virginia).
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of the unidentified third party's hoax, AOL had a duty to remove
the defamatory posting promptly, to notify its subscribers of the
message's false nature, and to effectively screen future defamatory
material." 45 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed,
reasoning that Section 230 creates "federal immunity" to any
cause of action" that creates liability for an online service
provider. 46
The word "provider" has been defined by Congress and the
judiciary as including website operators under the term
"interactive computer services." 47 In Schneider v. Amazon.com,
Inc.,48 Division 1 of the Washington Court of Appeals interpreted
Section 230 as applicable to web site operators, noting that web
postings on Amazon.com are "indistinguishable" from the posting
in question in Zeran.49 Further, in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,

Inc.,so the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
echoed the above ruling, holding that an online dating website,
which submitted questions to visitors who in turn provided
answers, was not liable for the defamatory content posted about
the plaintiff by a third party.51
45. Id. at 330.
46. See id. (stating that Section 230 "precludes courts from entertaining
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role.").
This preclusion further applies to service providers who chose to exercise
control over the defamatory material published. Id. Thus, even in performing
editorial decisions such as changing the content or deciding to publish, service
providers are granted blanket immunity. Id.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006).
48. See Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 38-39 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001) (arising out of false and negative comments posted on customer feedback
section of the website). After bringing the negative postings containing
material in violation of Amazon.com's stated posting criteria to the website's
attention, Schneider was told posts would be removed within two business
days. Id. When they were not, Schneider filed suit. Id. at 39.
49. See, e.g., Schneider, 31 P.3d at 40 (stating "Amazon's web site enables
visitors to the site to comment about authors and their work, thus providing
an information service that necessarily enables access by multiple users to a
server," bringing Amazon within the definition of an interactive computer
system).
50. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.
2003) (arising from a fabricated personal profile on an online dating website).
It was claimed that this personal posting was originated by the plaintiff,
actress Christine Carafano (a famous television actress acting under the
screen name Chase Masterson). Id. The posting included pictures of the
actress found online, sexually suggestive responses to the website's
questionnaire, and the plaintiffs home address and telephone number. Id.
Upon the defendant's delay in removing the post, which the actress alleged
contributed to several stalking incidents in the United States, plaintiff filed
suit. Id. at 1122.
51. See id. at 1124 (holding that Matchmaker was not even partly
responsible for posting content which the dating service helped create).
Matchmaker provided the multiple choice questions that the user would
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As interpreted by the courts, Section 230 immunizes any
website operator not responsible for the creation of the defamatory
content it publishes. Thus, a plaintiffs only chance of success in
proving a cause of action for online defamation is to uncover the
source of the post. Given the guarded nature of Internet postings,
the creator of defamatory material is easily able to remain
anonymous. 52
III. ANALYSIS

One running for an elected position is virtually outflanked by
the combination of the two areas of the law discussed above when
defamed on the Internet. 53 On one side, a political figure is held to
a much higher standard when proving defamation than the
average citizen due to a court characterizing them as a "public
figure." 54 On the other side, unless the identity of the creator of the
defamatory Internet post is discovered, the politician is barred
from bringing a defamation action against the website operator by
the immunity granted through The Communications Decency
56
Act.55 This section analyzes the application of the "actual malice"
standard and how politicians fit under the public figure
requirement. This section also analyzes the burden of proof a
plaintiff in a public figure defamation action must meet in order to
succeed. Further, this section explores the expansion of the
blanket immunity provided to all online publishers of defamatory
statements in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and
compares this Act to another federal law regulating content on the
Internet. Lastly, this section briefly examines the defamation
liability of traditional print media publishers.

answer in accordance with his physical characteristics, examples of potential
essay answers, and a section for the user to upload a photograph. Id. The
court reasoned that Matchmaker could not be considered an 'information
content provider' under the Communications Decency Act because no personal
"profile has any content until a user actively creates it." Id.
52. See St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that courts continue to cautiously view the Internet as
one large home for insinuation, rumor, and lies). The court further states that
there is no reliable way to authenticate material posted on the Internet noting,
"Anyone can put anything on the Internet." Id. at 775.
53. See supra notes 22, 35 and accompanying text (examining both the
heightened standard required by a public figure in proving defamation and the
blanket immunity granted online publishers through the Communications
Decency Act).
54. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(discussing the different standard for public figures).
55. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560, 561
(2006).
56. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
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A. New York Times v. Sullivan: Tailor-Made to Bar
Politiciansfrom Recovery
1. Politiciansas Public Figures?
The Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.5 7
established that a public figure may come from one of two
categories. The first category is a "public figures for all
purposes."58 This category encompasses politicians and celebrities
and is defined as those who hold great influence over society and
possess unfettered access to the media.59 The second category is a
"limited purpose public figures."6 0 This category is defined as those
who have "thrust themselves into the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved."6 '

Since the Court's ruling in Gertz, the Court has done little to
expand further on the definition of public figures. 62 Lower courts,
57. 418 U.S. 323.
58. Id. at 345.
59. See id. (explaining that public figures for all purposes are those which
hold positions of vast power and influence in society). Those that have
"assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society." Id.
60. See id. (stating that some public figures push themselves to the
forefront of a particular issue or controversy).
61. Id. It is remarkably rare for one to attain the recognition of a public
figure through no action of one's own. Id. For a history of the Supreme
Court's holdings on limited purpose public figures prior to Gertz, see Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); it held that a public figure
who is not a public official may recover damages in a defamation action by
showing conduct which is so unreasonable that it greatly deviates from the
investigative and reporting standards of a reasonable publisher). See also
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971) (holding that the
distinguishing factor of whether to apply the public figure standard is whether
the statement involved issues of public concern). The Court effectively
overruled both of these cases through the holding in Gertz. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
352.
62. See Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public Figures-Who Are
They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REV 955, 962 (1993) (noting that the three cases
involving the issue of a private v. public figure decided by the Supreme Court
since Gertz were each case specific, thus providing no further guidance for
interpretation of the standard); see, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
454-55 (1976) (holding that the recently divorced third wife of American
industrial heir Russell Firestone, Jr., was not a public figure for constitutional
purposes, regardless of the publicity that the dissolution of marriage
proceeding garnered in the public, as much of the publicity was created by
Florida divorce court's glib characterization of the parties accusations);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 114 (1979) (holding that a research
scientist who published writings and actively sought federal grant money for
his research projects was not a public figure for purposes of a defamation
action brought when a sitting United States senator referred to federal
funding of the scientist's work as "wasteful government spending"); Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1979) (holding petitioner not
a public figure for purposes of the New York Times standard when his failure
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however, have readily applied the public figure standard to
politicians bringing defamation actions. 63 For example, the
Supreme Court of Delaware recently held that a town council
member qualified as a public figure for purposes of a defamation
action. 64 Thus, one running for any civic office is likely to be
classified as a public figure for all purposes and thus subject to the
"public figure" classification under New York Times.65
2. A Public Figure'sBurden of Proving 'Actual Malice"
The standard for a public figure's proving defamation requires
that he prove "that the statement was made with 'actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."66 One commentator has expanded
on this standard stating that "the Court further held that a
plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence, which is a stricter standard than the civil preponderance
of the evidence, but less rigorous than the criminal standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt."67 This standard proves a difficult
to respond to a grand jury subpoena connected with allegations of Russian

espionage gathered the attention of a multitude of newspapers).
63. See Freedom Newspapers of Texas v. Cantu, 168 S.W.3d 847, 849, 853
(Tex. 2005) (holding that a candidate for county sheriff was a public figure
under the New York Times standard). Plaintiff, Cantu, a candidate for county
sheriff did not present the argument that he did not fall under the public
figure grouping. Id.
64. See generally Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (involving
statements posted online alleging elected town council member suffered from
"mental deterioration" and implying the councilman was a homosexual). The
issue of the councilman's status as a public figure was not an issue raised
before the court. Id.
65. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. For other examples of courts
qualifying people as public figures for all purposes, see Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47, 49 (1988) (finding Rev. Jerry Falwell, "a nationally
known minister who has been active as a commentator on politics and public
affairs," a public figure for general purposes under the New York Times
standard of defamation); see also Burnett v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr
206, 216 (Cal. Ct. App 1983) (finding famous actress, comedian, and television
star Carol Burnett a public figure for all purposes).
66. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; see also St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968) (noting that "reckless disregard" cannot be readily
defined). In attempting to expand further, Justice White states:
That reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent
man would have published, or would have investigated before
publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard
for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
Id. at 731; Garrison v. State of La., 379 U.S. 64, 67-68 (1964) (stating that only
defamatory statements made with a heightened level of suspicion as to the
untruthfulness of the content warrant criminal or civil punishment).
67. Meiring de Villiers, Opinionated Software, 10 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc.
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hurdle for public figure plaintiffs to clear,68 thus making the
likelihood of success in a public figure defamation action minimal.
Randall Bezanson, Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, has
stated that less than ten percent of media libel cases actually
succeed.69 Further estimations show that around seventy percent
of all media defamation cases end with the defendant obtaining
summary judgment. 70 The practical application of these statistics
to political candidates is evidenced in defamation action of Howell
v. Hecht.71
Howell and Hecht were both Republican primary candidates
competing for a seat on the Texas Supreme Court in 1986.72
Throughout the course of the campaign, it was brought to Howell's
attention that Hecht had allegedly made several defamatory
statements regarding Howell's character and fitness for the

269, 280 (2008).
68. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
768 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (noting that defamation plaintiffs often lose
on summary judgment because proof of malice is lacking). Justice White
further discussed the lack of remedy provided through this standard:
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving a jury case of malice, it may be that
the jury will be asked to bring in separate verdicts on falsity and malice.
In that event, there could be a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on falsity,
but against him on malice. There would be no judgment in his favor,
but the verdict on falsity would be a public one and would tend to set the
record right and clear the plaintiffs name. It might be suggested that
courts, as organs of the government, cannot be trusted to discern what
the truth is. But the logical consequence of that view is that the First
Amendment forbids all libel and slander suits, for in each such suit,
there will be no recovery unless the court finds the publication at issue
to be factually false. Of course, no forum is perfect, but that is not a
justification for leaving whole classes of defamed individuals without
redress or a realistic opportunity to clear their names. We entrust to
juries and the courts the responsibility of decisions affecting the life and
liberty of persons. It is perverse indeed to say that these bodies are
incompetent to inquire into the truth of a statement of fact in a
defamation case. I can therefore discern nothing in the Constitution
which forbids a plaintiff to obtain a judicial decree that a statement is
false-a decree he can then use in the community to clear his name and
to prevent further damage from a defamation already published.
Id. at 768 n.2.
69. See Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation:
Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 228 (1985) (noting further
that an additional 15% of all media libel cases settle, usually without a
monetary award). This statistic was promulgated twenty-three years prior to
the current date and thus does not reflect the impact that Internet defamation
cases may have upon this percentage.
70. Jonathan Garret Erwin, Note, Can Deterrence Play a Positive Role in
Defamation Law?, 19 REV. LITIG. 675, 693 (2000) (citing Marc A. Franklin,
Winners and Losers and Why: A study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 455, 492 (1980)).
71. 821 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App. 1991).
72. Id. at 628.
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bench.73 Howell petitioned Hecht for a retraction of these
statements claiming them to be false, and upon Hecht's refusal,
filed a Complaint alleging defamation.7 4 In bringing a motion for
summary judgment Hecht argued, "I had no knowledge indicating
to me that the complained of statements that I made were false at
the time those statements were allegedly made. Further, at no
time did I ever entertain any doubts as to the truth of those
complained of statements that I made."75 In response, Howell
submitted to the court the letter he had written to Hecht stating
the falsity of the statements and providing documentation from
the Supreme Court as to such.76 Howell provided additional
evidence showing Hecht continued to repeat these statements even
after receipt of the letter.77 The Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas
Division, affirmed Hecht's motion for summary judgment stating,
"We conclude that Howell failed to submit any specific affirmative
proof to show that Hecht entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of Hecht's publication." 78
Politicians of all governmental levels are likely to be deemed
public figures by the court for purposes of defamation law. This
status in turn requires courts to apply the "actual malice"
standard set forth in New York Times. This standard, however,
acts almost as an affirmative defense for one accused of defaming
a public figure, making a plaintiffs survival of summary judgment
unlikely.

73. See id. (noting Hecht is reported to have said that Howell is an
embarrassment to the Republican Party and the bench, lost numerous
campaigns for office, and was reprimanded by the Texas State Bar Association
for misrepresentation). Hecht further implied that Howell served a total of
thirteen weekends in jail for repeatedly being held in contempt of court. Id.
74. Id. at 628.
75. Id. at 630.
76. Id. at 631.
77. Id. at 628.
78. Id. at 631; see also Miller v. Nestande, 237 Cal. Rptr. 359, 365-66 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987) (finding negative comments made about plaintiff candidate's
activities and statements as a POW were not made with actual malice; award
of summary judgment for defendant affirmed); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d
567, 568 (Tex. 1989) (holding the newly elected mayor's campaign brochures
accusing the defeated incumbent of issuing payoffs to friends did not
constitute actual malice; summary judgment for defendant affirmed); Mohan
v. Fetterolf, 667 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that unless
plaintiff can provide evidence that defendants "knew or deliberately
disregarded the truth in publishing the defamatory information," plaintiff
cannot defeat motion for summary judgment).
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B. The Communications Decency Act: All Are Safe
1. Comparingthe Communications Decency Act with the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 79 (the "DMCA") was
enacted to protect copyright holders from the growing problem of
digital pirating online.80 It has been noted that as the Internet
expanded in reach and availability through the 1990s, the
availability of copyrighted material online grew exponentially,
leading to a marked increase in piracy online. 8 ' Aside from adding
new chapters to the United States Code, 82 the DMCA added
numerous new sections to the Copyright Act of 1976.83 It is one of
these new sections, the "Safe Harbor" provision, 84 upon which this
analysis will focus.
Section 51285 of the DMCA (known as the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (the "OCILLA"), provides
the setting for the copyright infringement liability of both Internet
Service Providers and website operators. Sections (a) and (b),86 not
at discussion in this Comment, deal directly with the
immunization of Internet Service Providers (the providers of
access to the Internet such as Comcast, AT&T, and Mediacom) for
the pirating of copyrighted material by their subscribers.8 7

79. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-352, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 & 28 U.S.C.).
80. See Diane Barker, Note, Defining the Contours of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: The Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the
DMCA, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47, 49 (2005) (noting the several failed
attempts by both the 104th Congress and the Clinton Administration to pass
legislation addressing the problem of digital piracy); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1186 (8th ed. 2004) (defining piracy as "the unauthorized and
illegal reproduction or distribution of materials protected by copyright, patent,
or trademark law.").
81. Barker, supra note 80, at 47-48.
82. See id. at 49 n.13 (noting the DMCA added chapters 12 and 13 to the
United States Code).
83. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see Jonathon J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera,
Social Networking Web Sites and the DMCA- A Safe Harbor from Copyright
Infrigement Libaility or the Perfect Storm, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 4
(2007) (explaining that section 512 is referred to as the safe harbor provision).
85. 17 U.S.C § 512.
86. Id. § 512(a), (b).
87. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling
Effects"? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 624 (2006)
(noting that Section (a) of OCILLA provides safe harbor for providers which
merely supply access to the Internet, e.g., "broadband, DSL, dial-up, and highspeed Internet access providers."). Authors label these providers as "mere
conduit[s]" through which information flows. . . ." Id.
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OCILLA Sections (c) and (d)88 provide the provisions by which
hosting services and search engines can gain safe harbor.89
Sections (c) and (d) of OCILLA9o provide website operators
and search engines the ability to limit their liability to copyright
holders for the pirating of copyrighted material by users through
abiding by what has become known as the "notice-and-takedown"
requirements.9 1 Section (c) requires the service provider (here, the
website operator), upon receipt of statutorily approved notice from
the copyright holder, to: "1) take down the material 'expeditiously';
2) notify the alleged infringer that material has been removed; and
3) forward any counter notices from alleged infringers back to the
original complainant."9 2 Serving this same purpose, section (d)
requires search engines to "expeditiously" remove links to the
objectionable copyrighted material from their search catalog.98
Further, OCILLA section (g) provides guidance for website
operators and search engines on when material may be reinstated
while also limiting liability for the erroneous takedown of said
material. 94 In essence, as long as the website operator complies
with the provisions of the statute, no liability attaches. As
discussed in Part II of this Comment, no such provision exists in
section 230 of the CDA. 95 This absence leaves one defamed online
88. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (d).
89. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 87, at 624-25 (explaining the aim of
OCILLA § 512(c) is directed at hosted content, defined as "websites, forums,
social networking profiles, and the like"). Further, the aim of OCILLA § 512
(d) is targeted at search engines like Google or Yahoo. Id. at 626.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (d).
91. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 87, at 626 (referring to portions of
§ 512 as "notice-and-takedown" requirements).
92. See id. 625-26 (noting that compliance with the notice-and-takedown
provisions is mandatory and requires no independent determination or
adjudication that the content in question is in fact infringing). Safe harbor is
thus conditioned upon compliance. Id.
93. Id.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1)-(4) (stating in part that no liability will attach
to the party in question if no suit is filed by the infringed party, against the
infringing party, within ten to fourteen business days following the receipt of
counternotice from the infringing party). The statute states further that no
liability will attach to the service provided if the provisions and procedures of
the statute are adhered to as required. Id.
95. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (providing Internet Service Providers blanket
immunity for any material, including material which is deemed defamatory,
contained within or posted on their website). The statute provides no legal
incentive for website operators to remove defamatory material upon notice
from the defamed as inducement to remain within the safe harbor of the
statute. Id. See also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (observing that plaintiff notified
defendant website operator of defamatory material posted on website on more
than one occasion to no avail). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in applying section 230 of the CDA (here, pleaded as an
affirmative defense), declared that attaching liability to publishers with notice
of defamatory material would defeat the stated objectives advanced by
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no legal recourse to petition the website operator for removal.
2. PublisherLiability for Defamation: Gone Paperless(and
Remediless?)
Traditional defamation law has always treated the publisher
of the defamatory statement as the author.9 6 Section 578,
illustration 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, has
demonstrated this principle simply, explaining that "a newspaper
feature syndicate supplies a defamatory article to each of its
subscribing newspapers. Each paper that prints the article has
published a libel for which it is separately subject to liability."97
This principle has been thoroughly echoed in case law.
Wright v. Bachmurski8 involved a newspaper publication
concerning a previous malpractice litigation between an
accountant, plaintiff, and his former client, defendant.99 The
defendant's exaggerations about the details of the litigation and
judgment made during an interview were subsequently published
in the local paper. 100 Upon plaintiff accountant's bringing of a libel
suit against this local newspaper for the republication, the parties
reached a settlement agreement of $120,000.101
In Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.,1 02 plaintiff, former
mayor of Providence, R.I., brought libel suit against defendant,
magazine publisher, for a defamatory story published about an
alleged rape and settlement agreement entered into by the mayor
while in law school.103 In reversing the grant of summary
judgment for defendants, and remanding for further proceedings,
the court noted that rule of liability for republication of

section 230 of the CDA. Id. at 330, 333. The Fourth Circuit, rather, estimated
that strict liability for publishers who do not respond to notice would further
restrict speech and stifle self-regulation. Id. at 333.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) ("Except as to those
who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who
repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if
he had originally published it."); see also Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith
& Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third Party Content on the
Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 471 (2004) (stating at common law,
newspaper publishers were subject to strict liability as they maintained final
control over the matter to be published).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1977).
98. 29 P.3d 979 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
99. Id. at 983.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. See id. at 56 (recounting in detail portions of the article accusing the
mayor of drugging the victim, threatening her with a gun, and raping her).
Cianci, on record, denied drugging, raping, or sleeping with the accuser. Id. at
58 n.7.
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defamatory material has been "widely recognized." 104 The court
expounded on this rule stating, "Any different rule would permit
the expansion of a defamatory private statement, actionable but
without serious consequences, into an article reaching thousands
of readers, without liability on the part of the publisher."10 5
In contrast, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
immunizes all Internet service providers for the republication of
defamatory material. 106 Thus, a newspaper's republication of a
defamatory statement is actionable whereas a website's
republication of that same statement is not. The disconnect
between these nearly identical entities is obvious. Conceivably, a
company could publish the same defamatory statement both
online and through its print newspaper and be held liable only for
the print version.
IV. PROPOSAL

malice" 107

standard applied to public figures in
The "actual
defamation actions must be lowered to an objective reasonable
person standard. Further, Congress must amend the
Communications Decency Act to remove the blanket immunity
provided to all online "publishers" of defamatory material.
Alternatively, notice and takedown requirements should be
implemented as a prerequisite to receiving immunization.
Without the removal of both these barriers to litigation, a public
figure defamed on the Internet is left powerless to defend his
reputation.

104. Id. at 60-61.
105. Id. at 61; see also Hoover v. Peerless Publ'ns, Inc., 461 F. Supp 1206,
1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 and
noting that one who republishes is subject to the same liabilities as the
original publisher); Olinger v. Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 409 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (stating that regardless of whether the republisher names the
source, the act of republishing is publishing itself). "The law affords no
protection to those who couch their libel in the form of reports or repetition."
Id.
106. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting
that legislators decided not to treat website operators and Internet Service
Providers like newspapers and magazines, both of which are liable for
republishing defamatory content, but rather to grant them blanket immunity
for essential the same action).
107. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (examining the background
and caselaw which led to the United States Supreme Court's creation of the
'actual malice' standard).
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A. Leveling the PlayingField: Lowering the Actual Malice'
Standardto an Attainable Objective Level
The current standard1 08 applied in public figure defamation
cases not only acts as a gatekeeper, ostensibly preventing public
figure plaintiffs from passing through the summary judgmentl 09
entryway of the pretrial motion phase, but also effectively
encourages authors and publishers to refrain from seeking out the
truth. The standard calls on public figures to convince the finder of
fact of the subjective intentions of the defaming party. 110 In
interpreting the "reckless disregard for the truth"' prong of the
"actual malice" standard, the Supreme Court has stated, 'There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication."1 2 In applying reasoning to this holding, one unable
to provide sufficient evidence of the defamer's doubts as to the
truth of the statement is thus unable to prove actual malice. 113
Justice White addressed this concern writing for the majority
in St. Amant v. Thompson. 114 Advocating for the position that the
108. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (prohibiting a public figure
from recovering damages for defamation pertaining to one's official behavior
unless it is proven that the statement was made with actual malice). Actual
malice is defined as "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
109. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting it has been that
estimated seven out of ten defamation cases brought against media defendants
do not survive motions for summary judgment).
110. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 (holding that the reckless disregard
section of the actual malice standard rendered in New York Times is not to be
discerned by whether a reasonable person would have published the
defamatory material if similarly situated). The Court stated that there must
be actual proof that the defendant doubted the truth of the material but
published it anyway. Id.
111. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
112. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
113. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (holding that a
newspaper's publishing of a column, stating that a candidate in an upcoming
Senatorial race was a "small-time bootlegger" during prohibition, can never be
irrelevant to the candidate's fitness for office). The Court, requiring evidence
of reckless disregard for the truth or actual knowledge of the statement's
falsity, reversed the libel judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remanded. Id.;
see also St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730-31 (stating that a public official falsely
accused of criminal conduct by a political opponent failed to prove the
statements were made with actual malice even though the speaker relied
completely on the information provided to him by his source, had no firsthand
knowledge of public official's misdeeds, and failed to corroborate the
information with those who might have had knowledge of the criminal
conduct); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 263 (noting that those responsible for
publishing the allegedly defamatory advertisement in question did not first
corroborate the stories contained within the advertisement with the
newspaper's own stories published on the topic and available on file).
114. 390 U.S. at 728.
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people's interest in the conduct and character of public officials
substantially outweighs the harm to a public figure's reputation
through an erroneous publication, Justice White prophetically
anticipated the unintended consequences of this subjective
standard. 1 5 "It may be said that such a test puts a premium on
ignorance, encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire,
and permits the issue to be determined by the defendants
testimony that he published the statement in good faith and
unaware of its probable falsity."116 It is, however, ultimately these
same tactics which cause this standard to be unattainable.1 7
Thus, a more appropriate standard for determining
culpability in a public figure defamation action is whether a
reasonable person' 1 8 knew or would have known the statement
published was false or that the statement was published with
reckless disregard for the truth. Inserting the reasonable person
standard transforms the analysis from an avoidable subjective
analysis to an objective one. In many ways, this objective standard
is nothing more than a recitation of the old standard with the
addition of a few words. With the introduction of reasonableness
into the analysis, the finder of fact is no longer bound by the
necessity that sufficient evidence of the speaker's doubts as to the
truthfulness of the statement be shown, but instead is free to find
culpability with a showing of the speaker's recklessness.1 9

115. Id. at 731-32
116. See id. at 731 (explaining that the "reckless disregard" standard may in
fact lead to fewer recoveries by public figure's defamed than if the standard
were lowered to that of a "reasonable man" or "prudent publisher"); see also
Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(A), Commercial Falsehood, and the First
Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV. 309, 345 (1993) (noting
that the 'actual malice' requirement acts to considerably increase the burden
of proof on the plaintiff while concurrently protecting speakers lacking
knowledge or doubt as to the falsity of their statements).
117. Justice White is not the only Supreme Court Justice to raise concerns
about the "actual malice" standard. See John W. Dean, Justice Scalia
Thoughts, and a Few of My Own, on New York Times v. Sullivan, FINDLAW,
Dec. 2, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20051202.html (recounting the
author's attendance of a speech by Justice Scalia's where he addressed the
state of the "actual malice" standard). It is reported that Justice Scalia
exposed his sentiment that New York Times was wrongly decided stating, "The
press is the only business that is not held responsible for its negligence." Id.
Justice Scalia further stated, "I don't think that's what the founding fathers
intended." Id.
-118. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1294 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the
"reasonable person" as "[a] hypothetical person" who acts with the level of
judgment, intelligence, and knowledge that society requires of its members for
the security of the interests of others and oneself). This standard is frequently
used to determine negligence in tort cases. Id.
119. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (providing examples of
United States Supreme Court holding that the actual malice standard not
satisfied in high profile public figure defamation actions).
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Further, the standard of proof for the "knowingly false"120 prong
essentially remains the same. The finder of fact will be required to
look at the totality of the evidence and decide: (1) would a
reasonable person in the speaker or publisher's position know or
should have known that the statement disseminated was false; or
(2) would a reasonable person, looking at the totality of the
circumstances, maintain serious doubts as the truthfulness of the
allegedly defamatory material.
B. Copying the OCILLA: Notice and Takedown Requirements
as a Prerequisiteto Immunity Under the Communications
Decency Act

The "Good Samaritan" sectionl2' of the Communications
Decency Act,122 interpreted by federal and state courts 123 as
providing absolute immunity from liability to any online service
provider for content published on its website, is overbroad and
antiquated. The permutations of the blanket immunity provided
by this section not only present a barrier to those defamed on the
Internet, but also negatively impede additional individual rights
falling under other unrelated areas of the law.124
In Zeran, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted

120. See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 (noting that it must be
proven that a speaker made a statement "with knowledge that it was false.").
121. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
122. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
123. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the
case law interpreting section 230 and interpreting the immunity provision to
cover publishers of online content).
124. See Stephen Collins, Comment, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet:
The Case for Amending the Communications Decency Act, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
1471, 1490-91 (2008) (attributing the recent decline in newspaper circulation
nationwide to an increase in the popularity and functionality of the Internet
as a source of both news and advertising). Collins continues by noting that the
blanket immunity provided to online service providers through the CDA has
opened the door for discriminatory housing advertising that would be held
actionable under the Fair Housing Act (§ 3604(c)) if published via print media.
Id. at 149; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006) (making it unlawful to make,
print, or publish any discriminatory housing advertisement indicating
preference for or against any "race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination"); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC., 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
defendant, Roommates.com, immune under section 230 of CDA for any
information published on the website's "Additional Comments" section).
Although the Ninth Circuit held Roommates.com liable for other violations of
the Fair Housing Act, the court was quick to defend the immunity provided by
the section 230 by stating that even where a close call exists as to a website's
culpability for encouraging illegality, the close call must be resolved in favor of
immunity. Id.
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that requiring online service providers to abide by notice and
takedown provisions would create an impossible burden for the
website operator due to the sheer number of postings foreseeable
and thus, although common practice for print media, would be
infeasible in the realm of the Internet.125 This case was decided in
1997,126 two years prior to the effective date of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 127 which successfully implemented
such provisions for online service providers. Accordingly, the
premise of this decision is factually false as this infeasible
procedure is now federal law.128 In light of the OCILLA's129
successful implementation of notice and takedown requirements
as a prerequisite to immunizing online service providers for
copyright infringement, Congress should amend the "Good
Samaritan" 30 section of the Communications Decency Act 3 1 to
follow suit. By requiring this same conduct of website operators as
a prerequisite to the receiving immunity for the publishing of
defamatory content, the website operator is now simply being held
to the same level of accountability for both defamation and
125. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (continuing this reasoning by analogizing
website operators to television network affiliates). In citing Auvil v. CBS 60
Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1992), the Fourth Circuit attempts
to draw a parallel between a television network affiliate's broadcasting of a
potentially defamatory news segment produced by the parent company and a
website operator's publishing of a potentially defamatory statement produced
by an online user. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. This analogy fails to consider the
feasibility of notice and takedown requirements applicable to television media
versus the Internet. Id. Where a television news story airs briefly,
encompassing a fifteen-minute window in this situation, notice and takedown
becomes virtually ineffective: once the news story is complete, no evidence of
the story remains available to the viewer. Although the story may be
defamatory and thus potentially actionable, the need for takedown is moot
upon completion of the broadcast. An Internet post, however, can remain
available for view by the Internet audience for days, months, or even years;
thus, precipitating the need for a notice to be provided to the website operator
of the existence of the defamatory content, and thus the need for the
subsequent taking down of the defamatory material.
126. Zeran, 129 F.3d 327.
127. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-352, 112 Stat.
2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 & 28 U.S.C.).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 512; see, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Damages at 3, Viacom International, Inc., v. Youtube Inc.,
(S.D.N.Y. March 13, 2007) (Civil Action No. 1:2007cv02103) (alleging that
more than 150,000 unauthorized clips of Viacom copyrighted material has
been found on defendant's website having been viewed approximately 1.5
billion times); see also Media Companies Blast YouTube for Anti-Piracy Policy,
FoxNEws.coM, Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252798,
00.html (noting that Viacom sent over 100,000 notices of copyright
infringement to YouTube in the month prior to bringing this litigation).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 512.

130. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
131. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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copyright infringement matters.
The notice-and-takedown
amendment to the "Good
Samaritan" section of the CDA should mirror the applicable
sections of OCILLAl32 with the addition of a few caveats tailoring
this provision to the publishing of any defamatory material. The
practical application of this amendment will look as follows: a
victim of online defamation contacts the website publishing the
statement and provides the statutorily required notice; the
website, upon finding the notice to be provided in good faith,
expeditiously takes down the defamatory post.133 Upon the taking
down of this statement, the website operator notifies the originator
of the post as to the complaint and action of the website. If the
originator believes the website erroneously removed the post,
he/she provides a statement asserting a good faith belief that the
post is not defamatory under penalty of perjury. If, after removal,
the statutorily determined period of time passes without the
defamed filing a claim for defamation, the website operator is free
to repost the statement. Only in following this procedure is the
publisher able to gain immunity.
V. CONCLUSION

A public figure's character and reputation are the bill of goods
that the politician sells to the electorate in an attempt to win his
vote. If defamation law exists to protect reputation, curing the
overbroad standard that obstructs the public figure from
recovering for a damage to this reputation only acts to ensure that
the free exchange of ideas surrounding a campaign are not clouded
with lies and half-truths. Further, by allowing an avenue for the
politician to (1) remove the half-truths and lies from the ever
growing world of online media; or (2) hold those responsible for
purveying this damaging material to the same standard applied to
their print media brethren, society can attempt to focus political
campaigns on the issues as opposed to the deception.

132. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c),(d) & (g).
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(c) (noting OCILLA provides no definition of the
term "expeditiously").

